A characteristic form of philosophical inquiry seeks to answer a 'what is it?' question. When philosophers ask such questions, they are looking for an informative analysis of the nature of the topic in question: what does it take for something to be knowledge? or a morally right action? or an instance of free will? or a member of a biological species? or the individual Barack Obama? or the logical function of negation? Different philosophical theories propose specific analyses of the nature of familiar but imperfectly understood topics. Alternatively, a theory will seek to show that, contrary to initial appearances, there is no single topic that we've been talking about with the relevant terms: contextualists about knowledge, for instance, argue that we pick out different epistemic statuses with the term 'knowledge' on different occasions of use, while incompatibilists about free will argue that our notion of freedom involves incoherent metaphysical commitments. In this chapter, we ask how philosophers do and should adjudicate debates about the correct answer to these 'what is x?' questions.
Our starting point in thinking about such questions is the first-person perspective of a rational inquirer. It's important to notice that from the first-person perspective, the object-level question 'what is x?' is equivalent to the metalevel question 'what is the reference (or, more generally, the semantic value) of my term "x"?' This meta-level formulation is important in part because some answers to the question -including contextualism, relativism, and some forms of error theory -simply cannot be formulated in object-level terms. But more importantly, we'll argue that meta-level considerations about one's past representational practice with 'x' are relevant to answering the 'what is x?' question even when one advocates a simple realist analysis. In this respect, our methods for answering a philosophical 'what is it?' questions are unlike our methods for answering more mundane questions like 'is x F?' or 'does x exist?'.
Taking our best first-person epistemic practices seriously, we suggest, supports a distinctive meta-level approach to philosophical methodology. We'll argue that philosophers do and should rely on a distinctive type of pragmatic and meta-representational reasoning -a form of rationalizing self-interpretationin answering 'what is x?' questions. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to articulating and defending this rationalizing self-interpretation account of philosophical methodology (section 2-section 4). By working through a specific example, we seek to isolate the relevant inputs into deliberation and the methods for adjudicating between competing answers to a 'what is x?' question. We suggest that the self-interpretive methods we isolate generalize across the board as a way of identifying the real nature of familiar topics.
Before taking up this task, however, we place this methodological discussion within a broader theoretical framework (section 1). We posit a necessary connection between epistemic methodology and metasemantics. On our view, the correct semantic assignment for a representation must be justifiable from the epistemic perspective of the subject herself, given suitable empirical information and cognitive powers. So the upshot of your own ideal, fully informed epistemic methods will determine the correct answers to 'what is x?' questions. This means our account of self-interpretation plays two important theoretical roles: it's both a core constraint on the determination of semantic values (reference), and an epistemological theory about the best methodology for discovering defining characteristics of familiar topics. The best methods for answering 'what is x?' questions must get one closer to the truth about x, on the original meaning associated with the token representation 'x' used in posing the question. It's crucial that there be no change of meaning in the course of answering the object-level question. So an account of our best methodology cannot afford to ignore the question of how representations acquire and change their semantic values. An advantage of an approach like ours, which satisfies a justifiability constraint, is that it provides a clear account of how epistemology and metasemantics are integrated.
Although it is not universally accepted, a justifiability constraint on the assignment of semantic values remains the dominant approach to metasemantics. In recent years, prominent champions of this sort of justifiability constraint have argued that it grounds a priori conceptual analysis. We believe this argument rests on a mistaken account of our best epistemic methods for identifying the nature of a familiar topic, x. In the last section of the chapter (section 5), we explain how our method of rationalizing self-interpretation undercuts the case for a priori conceptual analysis.
